



SCATOPSY: Malware Threat Mitigation in ICS/SCADA Operations

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Objective

Detect Malware Activity in SCADA workstations (e.g., Human Machine Interfaces or HMI) by correlating malware execution-relevant datapoints in ICS host and network behaviors





Figure 1: End-to-End ICS/SCADA process-control operation form a feedback control loop

- Observation/Insight
 - Unlike in Traditional IT, ICS/SCADA host operation is driven by ICS events (e.g., sensor measurements of physical process states)
 - To evade detection, modern ICS attacks stage and launch their payloads within these normal events to blend with benign SCADA host operations
 - Idea: Identify and model legitimate end-to-end SCADA behavior, which differentiate from attacker's malicious activities, enabling us to detect them

Approach and Challenges



- Build a baseline of legitimate ICS operation sequences 1-> 2-> 3
 - ICS Event -> SCADA Host Execution -> ICS Network Signal
 - Detect anomalous sequences in host execution and network activity
- Challenges:
 - I. Data Model for multi-dimensional sequences
 1. ICS Sensor Readings <ICS parameter, state, timestamp>
 2. SCADA Execution <Process Activity/API call, Argument, timestamp>
 3. ICS Network Signals <ICS parameter, func_code, state, timestamp>
 - II. Sequences may not be enough. Can be evaded by advanced malware ?
 - Additional physical properties/constraints may be needed
 - Statistical and Temporal behaviors

Initial Results

- Investigated the 2016 Industroyer Malware Attack on Ukraine Power Grid
 - Industroyer attacked circuit breakers and caused power outage
 - Analyzed Host and Network behaviors of the attack

```
TCP 44 49637->2404 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
104apci 50 <- U (STARTDT act)
TCP 44 2404->49637 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=7
104apci 50 -> U (STARTDT con)
TCP 44 49637->2404 [ACK] Seq=7 Ack=7
104apci 50 -> U (TESTFR act)
TCP 44 49637->2404 [ACK] Seq=7 Ack=1
104apci 50 -> U (TESTFR act)
TCP 44 49637->2404 [ACK] Seq=7 Ack=1
104asdu 64 -> I (0,1) ASDU=1 M IT NA 1
TCP 44 49637->2404 [ACK] Seq=7 Ack=3
104apci 50 -> U (TESTFR act)
TCP 44 49637->2404 [ACK] Seq=7 Ack=4
104apci 50 -> U (TESTFR act)
TCP 44 49637->2404 [ACK] Seq=7 Ack=5
104apci 50 -> U (TESTFR act)
```

```
IEC 60870-5-104-Asdu: ASDU=1 M_IT_NA_1 Spont IOA=4
  TypeId: M_IT_NA_1 (15)
  0... .. = SQ: False
  .000 0001 = NumIx: 1
  ..00 0011 = CauseTx: Spont (3)
  .0.. .... = Negative: False
  0... .... = Test: False
  OA: 0
  Addr: 1
  IOA: 4
    IOA: 4
      Binary Counter: 0
      ...0 0001 = SQ: 1
      ..0. .... = CY: No overflow
      .0.. .... = CA: Not Adjusted
      0... .... = IV: Valid
```

Figure 2: Industroyer Malware's ICS network behavior: Showing attack payload

Integration and Commercialization Plan

- Integration opportunities with RAD Gateway
- Commercialization based on further use case analysis
 - Distributed or centralized data collection and analysis?
 - Offline or online detection ?

Thank you

Questions ?