
Comprehensive Cybersecurity Technology for Critical Power Infrastructure AI-Based Centralized Defense and Edge Resilience





Malware Threat Mitigation in ICS/SCADA/OT Environment

Quarterly Review Workshop II

Dr. Wenke Lee, Moses Ike Georgia Institute of Technology May 6, 2022

ICS Malware Attacks is a big problem in OT



- 2010 Stuxnet: Iran centrifuge system
- 2014 Havex (various organizations)
- 2016 Industroyer: Ukrainian Power
- 2021 Oldsmar: Water Treatment Plant
- 2021 Colonial Attack: Oil and gas Pipeline
- 2022 Industroyer II


Limitations of Existing Tools

- Host System/API Call Behavior
- Malware/Attacks use similar API calls




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- Statistical Traffic/Protocol Analysis
- Only effective against obvious or noisy attacks (e.g., network scans, DoS, malformed protocols)



• Raises many false alarms in practice due to benign deviation (e.g., faults/noise)

THREAT MODEL



Preliminaries: Value and Impact

- Practical Usability
 - Georgia Tech is leveraging ICS domain knowledge from its collaborations with Industry, such as Sandia National Labs, to develop techniques that is usable in practice
- New Insights
 - Georgia Tech has gained new insights on the ICS-specific nature of ICS malware behavior (e.g., Industroyer)
 - Lesson Learned and toolset will Impact ICS Industry

Objective

Correlating multiple "malware execution-relevant" datapoints




Figure 1: End-to-End ICS/SCADA process-control operation form a feedback control loop

Leveraging ICS Domain Knowledge

- SCADA execution follows an event-based mechanism
 - To blend with SCADA behavior, attackers/malware follow the same events to stay hidden

Approach: Model the **end-to-end** SCADA behavior triggered by physical events (sensor states)

Develop a physical event-based behavior correlation algorithm







Initial Results: ICS Malware Host and Network Analysis

- 2016 Industroyer Malware Attack on Ukraine Power Grid
 - Industroyer sent malicious commands to circuit breakers and caused power outage





Figure 2: Industroyer Malware's ICS network behavior: Showing attack payload

- ICS-specific behaviors of Industroyer(Lesson learned)
 - Industroyer understood some physics of power systems
 - Terminated the legitimate SCADA program to hijack COM Ports to physical systems
 - Executed API calls may be anomalous to the core SCADA process-control
 - Sent Isolated commands not based on the physical dependences in the plant

Modern ICS Attacks are Semantic (Physics) Based




Adaptation of the 2021 Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack

Analyzing Physical Ramifications in SCADA execution

- Execution-Phase Specific API Behaviors
 - Submitted Major Revision to S&P Oakland 2023
- Statistical and Temporal Physical Dependencies Telemetry
 - Submitted to CCS 2022


Tool Development

- To Show Usability and Develop our Algorithm in Realistic Settings
 - Need to develop a SCADA Experimentation Testbed
 - A virtual testbed, with a SCADA side and a physical world side



Commercialization


- Promising Integration opportunities with RAD Gateway
- Concrete Commercialization based on further use case analysis
 - Distributed or centralized data collection and analysis?
 - Offline or online detection ?



QUESTIONS

Cyber Security News





CSIS, Significant Cyber Incidents, https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significantcyber-incidents