


| | |
|----------------|--|
| Arizona |    |
| Colorado |  |
| Georgia |  |
| Tennessee |  |
| Massachusetts |  |
| Michigan |  |
| Pennsylvania |  |
| Washington |  |
| Washington, DC |  |

Task 6

Threat hunting




Q2 - May. 9, 2022


| | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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The OODA loop in Threat Hunting – Reactive



Low energy sensors in ICS




Low voltage, low energy, low power



OBSERVE

1

Low frequency,
Low data volume,



Sufficient for operations management
But insufficient for attack investigation

ACT

4


ORIENT

2

DECIDE

3

Activating additional sensors



Trigger backup sensors to validate readings
Increase data collection frequency
Investigate out-of-band sensor data



OBSERVE

1



ACT


4

ORIENT



2

DECIDE

3




Industry relevance




sources of **sensory and security information** may be triggered/reconfigured by **security orchestration**

Plans



- Design reactive playbooks based on
 - must have and optional sensors specified in COPEs (from Task 2)
 - threat intelligence and adversary patterns (from Task 4)
- Showcase the hunting process orchestration in the forthcoming Delek US Lab (from Task 3)
 1. Start the monitoring with limited resources
 2. Detect anomaly configured for high TPR high FPR (from Task 10)
 3. Automatically trigger additional monitoring capabilities relevant to the detected anomaly (from Task 12)
 4. Detect anomaly configured for low FPR (from Task 10)

Exploration exploitation tradeoff in security orchestration automation and response (SOAR)



Multi-armed bandit policies for threat hunting

