BIRD ICRDE: Task 17 - ICS Security by Design

Empowering the Future: Security by Design in the Energy Sector

Introduction



Task 17 deals with the future



= > We are not bound to current concepts

We are not trying to predict the future; we try to be visionary

We propose a framework for achieving the Security by Design goal



Assumptions and prerequisite





Law and regulations

Industry requirements will force the use computerized devices at all levels of the Purdue model

We do not negate any security standard, or best practice, but rather, we mandate them





We already propose a framework consists of

Constructing an ecosystem that includes all participants

Non-technological Issues

Technological Issues

Presented in report meeting #4

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
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















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Framework - Ecosystem











Artifacts, Integrators,

SbD for the energy sector May 2023

Standards, regulations, Best Practices, Security, Quality, testing

Security by Design Requirements

Integrator

SW products

HW products

Networking

ISO 27K, NIST CSF, NIST SP 800-82 ISA/IEC 62443 ISO/IEC 12207, ISO 9000, MITRE ATT&CK

This presentation





The question was how do we see the future end node

Topics

- End node
- Connectivity

End Node

End nodes





Definition: End node

"a peripheral unit in a network, or a primary designated unit within that network.

IT professionals and others use the term "end node" to specify a certain hardware component of a network that has its own role and properties within that network system." [2]

End nodes






Requirements

- Functionality the physical functionality sensor, actuator, switch, ...
- Connectivity as today, not directly to the immediate upper layer, to the cloud,
- Robustness to side channel attacks, "regular" cyber attacks
- Security encryption of communication, digital signature
- Visibility health check
- Speed and Parallelism real time, near real time
- **Maintenance** timely, secure and easy

End nodes – hardware components HL diagram (partial)








End nodes – logic perspective diagram





IoT



End nodes – benefits from the suggested infrastructure





- Higer level of cyber security
- Potential edge computing capabilities
- Simultaneous cloud and non-cloud connectivity
- Potential of using Zero trust (ZT) and moving target defense (MTD) capabilities
- Certificate access control


Connectivity

Connectivity






Duplication



Connectivity - variants







Connectivity - variants

PLC)



#	Connection 1	Connection 2	Remarks
1	Physical PLC	Physical PLC	Same as today except the requirement to
			duplicate the number of connections
2	Physical PLC	Gateway	We assume a gateway with PLC capability.
			Moreover, we assume that the gateway
			converges the Physical PLC and the gateway
			that communicate to the upper levels of the
			Purdue model, e.g., HMI
3	Gateway	Gateway	We assume a converge of PLC and gateway
			that communicate to the HMI.
4	Physical PLC	Virtual PLC (V-PLC)	Virtual PLC is a software code that resides in
			the cloud. Communication to it may be set in
			various protocols, e.g., 5G, Wi-Fi, etc.
5	Virtual PLC (V-	Virtual PLC (V-PLC)	See (4) above. The connectivity can be done

to the very same cloud to different PLCs, or

to two different clouds.



Connectivity – Derived benefits





- Edge computing
- Maintenance
- Cloud
- Cyber robustness and resilience
- Using advance cyber security methods

Zero Trust (ZT)

Moving target defense (MTD)

Connectivity – Derived changes





Issues derived from the new form of connectivity

Algorithm changes

Work method change

Conclusion





- It's a long way
- Cost
- Better Cyber security
- Security by Design

Conclusion





We achieve

Encryption

Authentication

Visibility

Blockchain

Zero trust

Digital twin

Network segmentation

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End of

Empowering the Future:

Security by Design in the Energy Sector

Questions Please

Purdue – basic model

