Task 14 SubProcess BFT++: Robust Cyber Attack Resilience for Production Industrial Control Systems

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Subsystems:

- Physical Subsystems
- Cyber Subsystems
 - IT Space
 - Controller Space (our focus)



CPS Security Space

IT Space :

- Monitoring & intrusion detection is relatively easier due to predictability of CPS operation - industry already working on this space
- Encryption & authentication many researchers & industry already working on this space

Controller Space :

- Knowledge/Model dependent (e.g. digital twin, intrusion detection at controller bus level, etc) many researchers & industry are working on this
- Encryption & authentication researchers & industry already working on this space
 - limited computing capacity,
 - authentication is very relevant,
 - but encryption is less so in majority of applications (data is low-level, state dependent & temporal/short-lifetime)
- Mechanism (knowledge independent) our focus

Leveraging Key Properties of CPS Periodicity Inertia

 Continuous observe and control loop (scan cycle, usually ~1-100 Hz)



Periodicity provides tolerance for loss of input

- Sensitive to latency variations
- Not performing open-ended, generalpurpose tasks like IT

- Physical systems have *inertia*
- Effect: can tolerate some bad cycles and still maintain stability
 - Missed output
 - Wrong output (sensor blip, etc.)
- In context of cyber attack:

Inertia provides some natural fault tolerance

- Not immediately uncorrectable
- How long is system-dependent

Process of a cyber exploits



Successful attack requires:
1. Success on derailing targeted program --> targeted program loses control
2. Success on capturing control --> attacker controls program execution

Traditional Fault Tolerance

Many systems already employ some type of fault tolerance for physical and random failures:

Redundancy with voting/consensus

Quad Redundant Control (QRC)

Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT)

[BFT allows] systems to continue to work correctly even when there are software errors. Not all errors are survivable; our approach **cannot mask a software error that occurs at all replicas**. However, it can mask errors that occur independently at different replicas, including nondeterministic software errors

Challenge:



Traditional Fault Tolerance



Types of Diversity

- Execution level diversity
 - Same algorithm, same source code
 - Diversifying compiler
 (DARPA-CRASH)
 - Binary diversifying transformer (ONR, DARPA-CFAR)
- Algorithmic diversity
 - Different algorithm \rightarrow different source code
 - Exp.: sort → quick sort, bubble sort, merge sort & all sort of sort stuffs.

BFT++ assumes Execution Level Diversity

Key Elements of BFT++

Techniques work together to provide resiliency against cyber attack-induced failures



Successful attack requires:1. Success on derailing targeted program2. Success on capturing controlattacker controls program execution

Example: controller resilience



Artificial Diversity Divert: CO Own: jmp 4 Stream of inputs Output **Divert:** 0101 0011 set. C10110 1011 jmp 4 Own: jmp 7 **Divert:** se **C2** Own: jmp 2 Backup

Successful attack requires: Success on derailing targeted program targeted program loses control Success on capturing control attacker controls program execution

Artificial Diversity



Controller Recovery

- If we do not need to save controller state:
- Restore from a cold backup
- If we need to restore with state, need a hot/warm backup
- But how can we keep a hot backup that does not crash or get owned?
 - Must maintain a known good state,
 - check-pointing but it is expensive,
 - or may be not for LEGACY stuffs

Delayed Input Sharing



Delayed Input Sharing



Effect: 1 owned / 1 crashed, but C1's crash trigger is sitting in FIFO queue for C2

Existing BFT++ variants

BFT++ v1 (Vanilla) – NRL

- Multiple replicated devices with artificial software diversity to detect attacks
- A device replica with delayed input to promptly recover from attacks
- More robust security guarantee
- Less service disruptions
- Higher cost (due to device replica)



Existing BFT++ variants

BFT++ (YOLO) – Columbia University

- Firmware diversification (to probabilistically prevent and detect attacks)
- Frequent reset (to recover from attacks)
- Lower cost
- Probabilistic security guarantee
- More disruptions (due to frequent reset)



SubProcessBFT++

- Goal:
 - **Robust defense**: as robust as the Vanilla variant
 - Low cost: comparable to the YOLO variant
- Approach:
 - Operate on the subprocess level (the previous variants of BFT++ operate on the whole program)
 - For each subprocess, determine to duplicate (similar to vanilla variant) or randomize (similar to YOLO variant)
 - Diversify each subprocess according to profile & available slack

SubprocessBFT++ Workflow



Subprocess BFT++ workflow

Subprocess

- A single component of the ladder logic of a PLC program.

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Subprocess

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Translated c-code

```
// Code part
void TRAFIC LIGHT body (TRAFIC LIGHT *data ) {
  // Initialise TEMP variables
  SET VAR(data ->F TRIG0.,CLK,, GET LOCATED(data ->O LEDORANGE,));
  F TRIG body (&data ->F TRIG0);
  ___SET_VAR(data__->, TMP_OR67_OUT,, OR_ BOOL BOOL(
    (BOOL) BOOL LITERAL(TRUE).
    NULL.
    (UINT)2.
    (BOOL) GET VAR(data ->F TRIG0.0.),
    (BOOL) GET LOCATED(data ->FIRST CYCLE.)));
  SET VAR(data ->TOF0., IN,, GET VAR(data -> TMP OR67 OUT,));
  __SET_VAR(data__->TOF0.,PT,,__time_to_timespec(1, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0));
  TOF_body_(&data_->TOF0);
  SET LOCATED(data ->,0 LEDRED,, GET VAR(data ->TOF0.0,));
  __SET_VAR(data__->F_TRIG1.,CLK,,__GET_LOCATED(data__->O_LEDGREEN,));
  F TRIG body (&data ->F TRIG1);
  SET_VAR(data ->TOF1.,IN,, GET_VAR(data ->F_TRIG1.0,));
  __SET_VAR(data__->TOF1.,PT,,__time_to_timespec(1, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0));
  TOF body (&data ->TOF1);
  __SET_LOCATED(data__->,O_LEDORANGE,,__GET_VAR(data__->TOF1.Q,));
  SET VAR(data ->F TRIG2.,CLK,, GET LOCATED(data ->O LEDRED,));
  F TRIG body (&data ->F TRIG2);
  SET VAR(data ->TOF2.,IN,, GET VAR(data ->F TRIG2.0,));
  __SET_VAR(data__->TOF2.,PT,,__time_to_timespec(1, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0));
  TOF body (&data ->TOF2);
  __SET_LOCATED(data_->,O_LEDGREEN,,__GET_VAR(data_->TOF2.Q,));
  SET LOCATED(data ->,FIRST CYCLE,, BOOL LITERAL(FALSE));
```

- Time remaining after a task finishes before the next task or event is scheduled
- Greater usable slack allows for more subprocesses to be protected by replication in subprocessBFT++

 $UsableSlack = CycleTime-ReservedSlack - \sum SubprocessTime$

- This Usable slack comes from the time remaining in the Scan Cycle after deducting the time allocated to all subprocess on the processor
- Users can also specify a reserve of Scan cycle for their systems to retain

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- This Usable slack comes from the time remaining in the Scan Cycle after deducting the time allocated to all subprocess on the processor
- Users can also specify a percentage of Scan Cycle for their systems to retain even after securing it with SubprocessBFT++

OpenPLC and firmware profiling

- We have edited the OpenPLC compilation process to profile the subprocesses and how much time they take on the MCU in a single cycle
- Allows us to measure in real time the amount of usable slack available in the system

OpenPLC and firmware profiling

- First column: The sum time allocated to all subprocesses in a single cycle
- Second column: The total cycle time

* all measurements in microseconds

F	faraz@faraz-virtual-machine: ~/Desktop	Q	≡
faraz@faraz-virtual-macl total_used, cycle_time	<pre>hine:~/Desktop\$ cat slack_time.cap</pre>		
7179, 9948			
7178, 9954			
7181, 9950			
7169, 9941			
7179, 9949			
7170, 9939			
7169, 9939			
7177, 9956			
7181, 9948			
7178, 9951			
7171, 9936			
7182, 9951			
7179, 9952			
7169, 9939			

Slack Calculation

- Lets calculate the slack considering as a user we want to reserve 25% of the cycle slack

*All calculations in microseconds

*Using averages of the last 500 values when run for 1 minute

Total Slack = (9948) - (7175) = 2773

Reserved Slack = 2773 * 0.25 = 693

Usable Slack = (2773) - (693)

= 2080 micro seconds

F	faraz@faraz-virtual	-machine: ~/	Desktop	Q	
f <mark>araz@faraz-virtual-mach</mark> total_used, cycle_time	ine:~/Desktop\$	cat slac	k_time.cap		
7179, 9948					
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7181, 9950					
7169, 9941					
7179, 9949					
7170, 9939					
7169, 9939					
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7178, 9951					
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Discussion

- The greater the value of the slack with respect to the total time occupied by subprocesses the more we are able to use the duplication technique which has a greater level of security
- Replication not possible for all subprocesses as we do not have enough usable slack

Diversification



Diversification by multicompiler

- Multicompiler is our choice of diversification tool as it works on source code build by Michael Franz in UCI
- LLVM-based compiler to create artificial software diversity to protect software from code-reuse attacks.
- However, it works only for x86 targets. We ported it to ARM, a popular architecture for PLCs

Prototyping with OpenPLC

- Open-source Programmable Logic Controller development environment
- Widely used in industrial, home automation, and Internet of Things.
- Can produce PLC programs for a wide range of hardware, from Raspberry Pi to cloud servers
- Very practical for automating legacy systems since it can run on a range of hardware, and does not require great processing power



Prototyping with OpenPLC

- Our decision algorithm runs when OpenPLC compiles the firmware and decides which part of the system is protected by which methodology
- The OpenPLC compilation workflow is also edited to allow for compilation using multicompiler
- Our experiments used the Arduino NanoRP2040Connect



SubprocessBFT++ Workflow



Subprocess BFT++ workflow

Potential of SubprocessBFT++



- Significantly widen the applicability of BFT++ and provide resilience against direct cyber-attack
- Providing cyber attack resilience for application which cannot afford device redundancy, alleviate the need for redundant device in SubprocessBFT++
- Provide a degree of user control over the security to cost ratio
- Layered defence Automated isolation of offending data, which can be communicated to other system components, e.g. SCATOPSY, RAM2., to prevent repeat attack.
- Integration into OpenPLC design environment for ease of deployment and dissemination.
- Discussion with Siemens for potential integration of SubprocessBFT++ into with their PLCs for the purpose of commercialization.

Thank you



- Practically the same thing as BFT++
- Only difference being instead of 3 it has a total of 4 redundant copies

